

## The Mentoring Relationship as a Context for Psychological Contract Development

DANA L. HAGGARD<sup>1</sup>

*Department of Management  
Missouri State University*

DANIEL B. TURBAN

*Department of Management  
University of Missouri*

This study examined the mentoring relationship as a context for the development of psychological contracts and investigated the obligations that mentors and protégés feel that they owe and are owed in the mentoring relationship. By using psychological contract theory, we develop new insights into the dynamics of the mentoring relationship and extend psychological contract research by applying the theory to a relation outside the employer–employee context. Results indicate that both parties perceive that they owe and are owed obligations, and these perceptions are influenced by the formality of the relationship and the supervisory status of the mentor. Implications and suggestions for future research are discussed.

Considerable evidence indicates that mentoring relationships provide important benefits for both the protégé and the mentor (e.g., Allen, Eby, Poteet, Lentz, & Lima, 2004; Eby, Durley, Evans, & Ragins, 2006). Although mentoring functions can be provided by multiple developers within a network (e.g., Higgins & Kram, 2001), the traditional mentoring relationship involves one mentor providing a wide range of mentor functions to a protégé (Kram, 1985). Mentoring relationships are reciprocal, yet asymmetrical exchange relationships that are dynamic in nature and defined by the types of support provided by the mentor (Eby, Rhodes, & Allen, 2007). Mentoring relationships take place over time and involve repeated interactions. Collectively, these characteristics provide a context conducive to the development of a psychological contract (Rousseau, 1989, 1995).

According to Rousseau (1989), *psychological contracts* are “an individual’s belief regarding the terms and conditions of a reciprocal exchange agreement between that focal person and another party” (p. 123). Although in organizational research the most common context for investigating psychological contracts is the employer–employee relationship, the construct is not constrained to that relationship (Eddleston, Kidder, & Litzky, 2002; Rousseau & Tijoriwala, 1998). Because mentoring relationships are

<sup>1</sup>Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Dana L. Haggard, Department of Management, Missouri State University, 901 South National Avenue, Springfield, MO 65897. E-mail: DanaLHaggard@missouristate.edu

voluntary exchange relationships in which individuals expect to receive future benefit from the relationship (e.g., Ensher, Thomas, & Murphy, 2001; Young & Perrewé, 2000, 2004), it is likely that psychological contracts develop within the relationship. However, little research has applied psychological contract theory to mentoring relationships. Thus, we extend prior research by examining mentoring relationships as a new context for psychological contracts.

Understanding the mentoring relationship in terms of a psychological contract is important for several reasons. First, although we know what functions mentors provide (e.g., Kram, 1985; Ragins & Cotton, 1999) and what benefits mentors might gain from the relationship (e.g., Eby et al., 2006; Ragins & Scandura, 1999), we do not know what specific obligations, if any, mentors and protégés feel they have in the relationship. While mentoring researchers have examined expectations within the mentoring relationship (Young & Perrewé, 2000, 2004), expectations and obligations are not the same thing (Robinson, Kraatz, & Rousseau, 1994; Sutton & Griffin, 2004). Psychological contract theory suggests that we shift the focus from what one expects to gain from the relationship to what one feels he or she is obligated to provide in the relationship. Second, understanding these obligations might provide valuable insight into why some specific functions are provided and others are not, especially with regard to structural characteristics of the relationship, such as the level of formality.

The purpose of this study is to examine psychological contracts in mentoring relationships and, in so doing, to answer the following questions:

1. Do mentors and protégés perceive the relationship as one that involves obligations both for themselves and the other party?
2. If so, how might these obligations differ in formal or informal relationships?
3. How might these obligations differ in supervisory versus nonsupervisory relationships?

### Theoretical Framework and Hypothesis Development

Psychological contract theory is based largely on social exchange theory and assumes that individuals form, maintain, and terminate relationships based on the belief that the benefits outweigh the costs of the relationship (Blau, 1964; Ensher et al., 2001). According to Rousseau and Tijoriwala (1998), "A psychological contract is an individual's belief in mutual obligations between that person and another party" (p. 679), and these contracts "originate when individuals infer promises that give rise to beliefs in the existence of reciprocal obligations" (p. 680).

There are several important points to note about psychological contracts. First, such contracts are comprised of an individual's perception of mutual obligations, not a shared perception of actual obligations. Second, the promises, which lead to perceived obligations, may be implicitly as well as explicitly made and understood. Finally, the resulting obligations are distinguished from general expectations employees have about what they will encounter in their jobs as obligations emanate from a specific source (e.g., an employer, supervisor, mentor), and not from a wide variety of sources (e.g., past experience, social norms; Robinson, 1996). In addition, psychological contract obligations differ from expectations in the significantly more visceral reactions encountered when obligations are not fulfilled (Rousseau, 1989; Sutton & Griffin, 2004).

Psychological employment contracts are influenced by an individual's experiences with the employer and with agents of the employer (Ho, 2005; Rousseau, 1995). Contributors to the psychological employment contract include supervisors, recruiters, representatives of human resources departments, employee handbooks, coworkers, and mentors (Rousseau, 1995; Scandura & Williams, 2002). Although the most common context for examining psychological contracts is the employment relationship, psychological contracts have been applied to other relationships as well. For example, researchers have investigated psychological contracts in employee–customer relationships (Eddleston et al., 2002), supplier–distributor relationships (Kingshott, 2007), and advisor–student relationships (Bordia, Hobman, Restubog, & Bordia, 2010). Psychological contracts between advisors and students likely share many attributes with that of the psychological mentoring contract because of the developmental nature of both relationships, the power difference between the two parties, and the influence the senior partner has over outcomes for the junior partner.

In general, obligations in psychological employment contracts are what individuals feel they owe the organization and what they feel the organization owes them. Traditional examples include training, opportunities for advancement, and job security in exchange for hard work and loyalty (Rousseau, 1995; Rousseau & Tijoriwala, 1998). Analogously, we conceptualize the *psychological mentoring contract for protégés* as the obligations they believe they owe their mentors and that their mentors owe them. Similarly, *psychological mentoring contracts for mentors* are the obligations they believe they owe their protégés and that their protégés owe them.

We make the distinction between the psychological employment contract and the psychological mentoring contract in order to differentiate our theorizing regarding mentoring relationships from existing theorizing regarding employment relationships. Although both types of contracts might develop in similar ways, psychological mentoring contracts are different in important ways.

### Development of the Psychological Mentoring Contract

Psychological employment contracts do not develop in a vacuum. Instead, individuals pick up cues to mutual obligations from many sources, including coworkers, recruiters, supervisors, mentors, organizational socialization rituals, and the organizational environment (Dabos & Rousseau, 2004b; Ho & Levesque, 2005; Rousseau, 1995, 2001). Although participants in psychological mentoring contracts might also pick up cues from coworkers and the environment, we expect that they are more likely to seek cues from individuals they consider to be fellow protégés (current or former). We expect that protégés might seek information about other protégés' mentoring contracts in order to understand the mutual obligations in a mentoring relationship. Similarly, mentors also might pick up cues in the organizational environment regarding the mutual obligations mentors and protégés have to one another. However, when it comes to seeking out additional information regarding their obligations, mentors likely turn to their peers who are also serving as mentors to other protégés.

An important point to remember is that psychological contracts are conceptualized as an individual's perceptions of mutual obligations, and that actual agreement on the contract terms is not a requirement for a psychological contract to exist (Rousseau, 1989). Because the psychological contract is conceptualized as an individual's perception—albeit a perception of mutual obligations—organizations do not have a psychological contract with the employee. Thus, psychological mentoring contracts differ from psychological employment contracts since in the former both parties are individuals capable of developing a psychological contract. Furthermore, it is possible that an individual might form a psychological mentoring contract with someone they consider to be a mentor (or protégé) without the other party developing a psychological contract with them.

Because supervisors are seen as agents of the organization, they are considered to influence the formation of psychological employment contracts (Rousseau, 1995). Because protégés commonly report that their mentors are also their supervisors, supervisors who are considered mentors by their protégés have a direct influence on the formation of the protégés' psychological mentoring contract. This structural aspect of the relationship (whether or not the mentor is the direct supervisor) is one that likely results in a different set of obligations than those in a mentoring relationship with someone other than their supervisor. The differences in obligations between supervisory and nonsupervisory relationships are likely similar to the differences between advisory and nonadvisory relationships in an academic setting. Both the faculty advisor and the supervisor have direct influence over outcomes for the protégé/student, which might influence the perceived obligations.

### Obligations in the Mentoring Relationship

Mentor relationships are frequently described in terms of the mentoring functions provided by the mentor to the protégé (e.g., Allen & Eby, 2004; Chao, Walz, & Gardner, 1992; Ragins & Cotton, 1999). Although we recognize that these functions might not represent the universe of possible mentor obligations, based on the extensive work used in the development of mentoring function scales (e.g., Noe, 1988; Ragins & McFarlin, 1990), we believe that they likely represent the most common obligations manifested in mentoring relationships.

#### *Mentor Functions*

The functions provided by the mentor are classified into two dimensions: career and psychosocial functions (Green & Bauer, 1995; Wanberg, Welsh, & Hezlett, 2003). Kram (1985) described *career functions* as “those aspects of the relationship that enhance career advancement” (p. 23), such as sponsorship, exposure and visibility, coaching, protection, and challenging assignments. *Psychosocial functions* include acceptance and confirmation, counseling, and friendship (Kram, 1985). Both career and psychosocial functions are behaviors enacted by the mentor that help the protégé achieve both objective success (e.g., salary, promotions) and subjective success (e.g., career satisfaction; Allen et al., 2004). We theorize that protégés might believe that mentors have promised to perform such behaviors on their behalf, and mentors might feel a sense of obligation to perform such behaviors. It is important to note, however, that having an obligation does not always result in fulfilling the obligation.

#### *Protégé Functions*

Most of the literature on the mentoring relationship has focused on what the protégé receives (Mullen & Noe, 1999; Noe, Greenberger, & Wang, 2002). More recently, however, there has been increased discussion of the benefits mentors receive from the relationship (e.g., Eby et al., 2006; Ragins & Scandura, 1999), although little is known about the type or extent of protégé functions provided to the mentor. Nonetheless, evidence does suggest that protégés provide mentors with friendship, companionship, loyalty, access to information, and assistance with projects (Kram, 1985; Mullen & Noe, 1999; Spencer, 2006). In addition to these, we expect that protégés have an obligation to show mentors respect and to exhibit a willingness to learn (Allen, 2004).

In viewing the mentoring relationship as a psychological contract, we theorize that both mentors and protégés believe that each has obligations to the other. For example, we expect that protégés believe that they have obligations to their mentors in exchange for the help they have received and expect to receive in the future.

*Hypothesis 1a.* Mentors will report obligations for both themselves and for their protégés.

*Hypothesis 1b.* Protégés will report obligations for both themselves and for their mentors.

### Relational Versus Transactional Obligations and Structural Characteristics of the Relationship

In general, psychological contracts vary in the extent to which they are conceptualized as transactional, relational, or hybrid, based on the specific obligations perceived (Dabos & Rousseau, 2004a; Rousseau, 1995). *Transactional psychological employment contracts* are characterized by a short-term (limited) outlook, monetized inducements, lack of flexibility, and clearly understood expectations and obligations (Rousseau, 1995; Rousseau & McLean Parks, 1993). *Relational psychological employment contracts* are characterized by a long-term outlook, intrinsic rather than economic inducements, and ambiguous obligations (Rousseau, 1995; Rousseau & McLean Parks, 1993). Relational and transactional obligations are not mutually exclusive, and contracts that contain a combination of these aspects are referred to as *hybrid* or *balanced* (Dabos & Rousseau, 2004a).

By extension, we theorize that mentoring contracts will vary in the extent to which they contain transactional (career/instrumental-oriented) or relational (relationship-oriented) obligations. As with psychological employment contracts, the obligations in mentoring contracts are not seen as mutually exclusive. Thus, both types of obligations can exist simultaneously in the same contract, though relationships can be described as more or less relational or more or less transactional.

Kram (1985) described mentoring relationships that are based mostly on career functions as transactional, and we expect such relationships to be characterized predominantly by instrumental or career-oriented obligations. Thus, transactional obligations are characterized by the professional development or benefit that mentors and protégés receive from the relationship. Examples of mentor transactional obligations include providing challenging assignments or opportunities to meet key organizational figures. Assistance with projects is an example of a transactional protégé obligation. Relational

mentoring contracts are characterized by obligations specific to the socio-emotional relationship between the parties. Examples of mentor relational obligations include psychosocial support and encouragement of the protégé, whereas protégé relational obligations might include loyalty and friendship.

Although transactional and relational obligations coexist and we expect them to be correlated, we also expect that they will be differentially influenced by structural characteristics of the relationship. For example, some mentoring relationships might have more relational obligations than other relationships as a result of how the relationship was initiated.

### *Relationship Formality*

*Relationship formality* refers to how the relationship is initiated and maintained. Informal mentoring relationships develop spontaneously, typically based on mutual identification and the fulfillment of career needs (Chao et al., 1992; Ragins & Cotton, 1999). Thus, in informal relationships, mentors and protégés select partners with whom they enjoy working and share chemistry (Kram, 1985). Conversely, formal mentoring relationships are formed by organizational processes that pair or encourage the development of relationships, usually with the explicit goal of aiding protégés' careers (Chao et al., 1992). Formal mentoring relationships tend to be more transactional than do informal relationships, as well as shorter in duration and more focused on immediate career goals for the protégé (Ragins & Cotton, 1999).

We theorize that the differences in how the mentoring relationship is initiated will influence the types of obligations in the following ways. First, because informal relationships are more relational, we expect mentors and protégés in informal mentoring relationships to report more relational/psychosocial obligations to the other partner than will their formal counterparts. Second, because informal relationships are formed from a mutual sense of liking, rather than facilitated by the organization, it is likely that both mentors and protégés will expect more relational/psychosocial functions than will participants in formal relationships. In summary, individuals in informal versus formal mentoring relationships are expected to report more self (i.e., what they owe) and other (i.e., what the other owes) relational obligations.

*Hypothesis 2a.* Informal mentors will report more self and other relational obligations than will formal mentors.

*Hypothesis 2b.* Informal protégés will report more self and other relational obligations than will protégés with formal mentors.

The relationships regarding transactional obligations are not as clear. Formal mentoring relationships tend to focus on short-term career goals for the protégé (Ragins & Cotton, 1999) and are facilitated by the organization to help protégés advance, which suggests that formal relationships entail transactional obligations. It is unclear, however, whether formal relationships would have more transactional obligations than informal relationships, as informal relationships also are expected to have transactional obligations. Furthermore, some evidence suggests that informal relationships tend to be more beneficial for protégés' career outcomes than formal relationships (Chao et al., 1992), which suggests that informal relationships also have transactional obligations. To summarize, we expect both informal and formal relationships have transactional obligations. Although we do not expect formality to influence transactional obligations, we will examine this relationship as an exploratory issue.

### *Supervisory Versus Nonsupervisory Mentoring*

Supervisory mentoring serves the same basic functions as does traditional mentoring, but with the additional factor of a direct reporting relationship (Booth, 1996; Scandura & Schriesheim, 1994; Scandura & Williams, 2004). We theorize that because mentors with protégés as direct reports have significant influence over their protégés' career outcomes, such mentors feel that they have more transactional obligations to those protégés than do nonsupervisory mentors. For example, supervisory mentors who have the power to assign projects to their subordinates can involve their protégés in challenging projects. Also, supervisory mentors may have more direct input into promotions and lateral moves than do nonsupervisory mentors. Analogously, supervisory mentors might expect more transactional obligations from their protégés than will those with nonsupervisory relationships because of the direct assistance and support that subordinates can provide the supervisor.

Because of the power supervisors have over career outcomes for subordinates, we expect that protégés with supervisory mentors will perceive more transactional obligations on the part of their mentors than will protégés with nonsupervisory mentors. Furthermore, we theorize that protégés who are direct reports will perceive that they have more transactional obligations to their mentors than do protégés with nonsupervisory mentors. For example, protégés in supervisory mentoring relationships are in a position to provide high performance and assistance with projects.

*Hypothesis 3a.* Mentors in supervisory mentoring relationships will report more self and other transactional obligations than will mentors in nonsupervisory mentoring relationships.

*Hypothesis 3b.* Protégés with supervisory mentors will report more self and other transactional obligations than will protégés with nonsupervisory mentors.

With regard to the relational obligations of mentors and protégés, there is no clear theoretical support for either more or less obligations, depending on the supervisory nature of the relationship. Thus, although we will examine these obligations with respect to mentor supervisory status, we have no a priori predictions as to the relative level of relational obligations conditioned on mentor supervisory status.

In summary, we conceptualize the mentoring relationship as a context for the development of a psychological contract. For protégés, the psychological mentoring contracts are the obligations protégés feel that they owe their mentors, and the obligations that they feel their mentors owe them. For mentors, the contracts are the obligations that they feel they owe their protégés, and the obligations that they feel their protégés owe them. We expect these obligations to reflect the relational and transactional dimensions of the relationship and to be influenced by the formality and supervisory nature of the relationship.

## Method

### *Procedure*

Participants were College of Business alumni from a large public university in the midwestern United States. The sample of prospective protégés was drawn from alumni between 3 and 15 years post-graduation in order to maximize the potential pool of protégés. We asked these recipients to complete a survey and, if they currently have or have had a mentor, to give their mentor a survey to complete and return.

### *Sample*

We mailed surveys to 1477 alumni. Of those mailings, 110 were returned because of bad addresses. Of the 305 alumni surveys that were returned (overall response rate = 22.3%), 158 surveys (52%) were from individuals who indicated they were protégés in a mentoring relationship. Unfortunately, the mailing list information did not allow us to eliminate the unemployed, self-employed, or those with incorrect addresses. Therefore, we believe that our response rate is a conservative estimate.

The percentage of self-reported protégés falls within the range reported in previous studies (Scandura & Williams, 2001; Sosik & Godshalk, 2000b). We included mentor surveys in the package and requested that each protégé give

the survey to his or her mentor. We received 50 mentor surveys, 42 of which contained complete data. If we assume that all protégés gave their mentors a survey, the mentor response rate is approximately 30%.

The protégés were predominantly White (95%), female (93 females, 65 males), and ranged in age from 25 to 53 years ( $M$  age = 32.3 years). With regard to job type, 61% described their jobs as professional, 35% as managerial, and 4% as technical. The mentors were predominantly White (95%) and male (29 males, 21 females).

There were 6 protégés who reported that their mentors were outside their organizations. Because of the unique characteristics of these types of relationships (they likely limit potential career obligations) and the small number reported, we did not use these respondents in our analyses. This left us with 152 respondents, although 2 did not indicate their mentors' supervisory status, and 4 did not respond to the question regarding the formality of the relationship.

### Measures

*Protégé status.* Participants were given the following definition of a *mentor*, which was adapted from existing definitions (Dreher & Chargois, 1998; Eby, Butts, Lockwood, & Simon, 2004): "an individual who holds a position senior to yours who takes an active interest in developing your career. A mentor may or may not be your supervisor and may or may not be in your organization." Respondents were then asked if they currently have a mentor and if they have had a mentor in the past.

We used this definition of *mentor* for several reasons. First, it limits the relationship to a dyadic relationship between a more senior person and a more junior person. Second, it does not list specific behaviors on the part of the mentor, which would overlap with the mentoring obligations to be measured. Finally, this definition does not contain phrases like "committed to," "intense," or "agreed upon goal," which might be construed as overlapping with the measure of mentor obligations or biasing the responses to individuals who feel that they have contracts, and excluding others who might not see the relationship as more than a simple exchange relationship.

*Formality.* Protégés were asked to indicate the level of formality of the relationship. The response choices were, "Formal—company program assigned or matched me with my mentor," and "Informal—relationship developed spontaneously out of mutual interest." We coded *formal* as 1 ( $n = 54$ ) and *informal* as 0 ( $n = 94$ ).

*Supervisory relationship.* We asked protégés to indicate their mentors' place in the organizational hierarchy. The response choices were as follows:

1 = *My mentor is my immediate supervisor*; 2 = *My mentor is one level up in the organizational hierarchy, but not my immediate supervisor*; 3 = *My mentor is two or more levels above me in the organizational hierarchy*; and 4 = *My mentor is outside my organization*. The majority of protégés reported having direct supervisors as mentors ( $n = 85$ ). The numbers of mentors one level up and two or more levels up were 27 and 38, respectively. We coded direct supervisory relationships as 1 and nonsupervisory relationships as 0.

*Mentor obligations.* In order to measure mentor obligations to protégés, we created a scale patterned after a psychological contract measure that was used by Lester, Turnley, Bloodgood, and Bolino (2002). More specifically, we used the extensive literature on mentoring functions as a starting point, as the functions discussed there likely represent the most common mentor obligations. The items in the scale (see Table 1) represent the generally accepted career and psychosocial mentor functions that were originally identified by Kram (1985). We asked both mentors and protégés to indicate the extent to which mentors had the listed obligations to their protégés. Response choices ranged from 1 (*not at all*) to 3 (*to some extent*) to 5 (*to a very large extent*).

Consistent with psychological contract research, we did not ask respondents to classify the obligations as either relational or transactional (Ho, Rousseau, & Levesque, 2006; Robinson & Morrison, 1995), but instead we utilized the factors that emerged from the data. A principal components analysis with varimax rotation using responses from both mentors and protégés suggests that two factors accounted for 65% of the variance. A two-factor solution is consistent with the theory behind the creation of the scale. We assigned items to scales when the primary loading was .60 or higher and the cross-loading was less than .35.

Although the initial relational (psychosocial) obligations factor was comprised of four items, subsequent reliability analyses indicate that a two-item scale had the greatest reliability (see Table 1). Specifically, coefficient alpha was .73 for both the mentor perceptions of their relational obligations to their protégés (i.e., mentors' self relational obligations) scale and for the protégé perceptions of the relational obligations they felt they were owed by their mentors (protégé expected relational obligations) scale.

The transactional (career) obligations factor was comprised of four items. Subsequent reliability analyses indicate, however, that a three-item scale maximized coefficient alpha. More specifically, the coefficient alpha for protégés' perceptions of the transactional obligations they felt they were owed by their mentors (protégé expected transactional obligations) was .86. However, the coefficient alpha for mentors' perceptions of the transactional obligation they felt they owed their protégés (mentors' self transactional obligations) was only .52.

Table 1  
*Means for Mentor and Protégé Obligations*

	Mentor relational obligations		Protégé relational obligations	
	Mentor self	Protégé expected	Mentor expected	Protégé self
To be available to talk about non-work as well as work activities <sup>a</sup>	3.93	3.30	Loyalty 3.81	4.16
To be a source of encouragement and advice	—	—	Respect 4.07	4.56
To accept him/her for who he/she is and trust his/her judgment	4.57	4.39	Friendship 2.98	3.40
To give him/her specific advice about organizational politics <sup>a</sup>	4.29	3.93	Support <sup>b</sup> 3.95	4.27
	4.21	3.84	Deference <sup>b</sup> 3.07	3.62
Mentor transactional obligations				
	Mentor self	Protégé expected	Mentor expected	Protégé self
To publicly support him/her for promotions and lateral moves	3.81	3.66	Assistance with projects 4.00	4.14
To give him/her the opportunity to interact with key organizational figures	3.98	3.58	Willingness to learn 4.43	4.65
To intervene on his/her behalf in controversial situations <sup>a</sup>	3.55	3.38	High performance 3.90	4.56
To involve him/her in challenging projects to expand his/her skills	4.36	3.93	Information 3.81	4.19

*Note.* Each scale was phrased from the appropriate perspective to ask to what extent the respondent thought the other party had an obligation regarding each of the items.

<sup>a</sup>Item not included in mentoring obligation scales.

<sup>b</sup>Item not included in protégé obligation scales.

*Protégé obligations.* In order to measure protégé obligations to the mentor, we created a nine-item scale (see Table 1). The items that we selected were drawn from existing research indicating how mentors benefit from the mentoring relationship (e.g., Allen, 2004; Mullen & Noe, 1999). Both partners indicated the extent to which the protégé had the obligation to the mentor. Consistent with work on psychological contracts, we did not ask respondents to categorize the obligations as either relational or transactional, but instead relied on factor analysis to classify the obligations.

A principal components analysis with varimax rotation using responses of mentors and protégés suggests two factors that accounted for 57% of the variance. A two-factor solution is consistent with the theory behind the creation of the scale. We assigned items to scales when the primary loading was .60 or above and the cross-loading was less than .35.

The relational obligations factor was comprised of three items (i.e., loyalty, respect, friendship). Coefficient alpha for mentors' perceptions of the relational obligations they felt they were owed by their protégés (mentor expected relational obligations) was .70. Coefficient alpha for protégés' perceptions of the relational obligations they owe their mentors (protégé self relational obligations) was .66.

The transactional obligations factor was comprised of four items (i.e., assistance with projects, willingness to learn, high performance, information). These items appear to have instrumental value to mentors, as they represent ways in which the protégé can provide career assistance to the mentor. Subsequent reliability analyses indicate that these measures had acceptable reliability. Coefficient alpha for mentors' perceptions of the transactional obligations they were owed by their protégés (mentor expected transactional obligations) was .78. Coefficient alpha for protégés' perceptions of the transactional obligations they owed their mentors (protégé self transactional obligations) was .76.

## Results

Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations among the variables. The means presented in Tables 1 and 2 indicate that both mentors and protégés perceived that they had obligations to, and expected obligations from, the other party. Such results provide preliminary support for Hypotheses 1a and 1b that both mentors and protégés perceive obligations in mentoring relationships.

### *Hypotheses 1a and 1b*

Hypotheses 1a and 1b stated that mentors and protégés would report obligations both for themselves and for their relationship partners. In order to

Table 2

*Correlation Matrix*

Variable	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Formality	0.36	0.48	—									
2. Supervisory Mentor reported	0.57	0.50	-0.08	—								
3. Mentors' self relational obligations	4.43	0.52	-0.32*	-0.07	(.73)							
4. Mentors' self transactional obligations	4.05	0.59	-0.21	.37*	.43**	(.52)						
5. Mentor expected relational obligations	3.63	0.72	-0.07	.09	.12	-0.05	(.70)					
6. Mentor expected transactional obligations	4.04	0.68	.03	.31*	.01	.36*	.26	(.78)				
Protégé reported												
7. Protégés' self relational obligations	4.04	0.69	-0.19*	-0.10	.31*	.45**	-0.25	.05	(.66)			
8. Protégés' self transactional obligations	4.39	0.61	-0.21*	.17*	.39*	.46**	-0.17	.13	.54**	(.76)		
9. Protégé expected relational obligations	4.16	0.80	.02	.00	.01	.15	.01	.19	.55**	.42**	(.73)	
10. Protégé expected transactional obligations	3.72	1.00	-0.02	.22**	.06	.40**	-0.21	.30	.34**	.61**	.49**	(.86)

*Note.* Formality: 1 = *formal*, 0 = *informal*. Supervisory: 1 = *supervisory*, 0 = *nonsupervisory*. Within-mentor,  $n = 42$ ; within-protégé,  $n = 147-151$ ;  $n$  for cross-dyadic correlations range between 41 and 42.  
\* $p \leq .05$ . \*\* $p \leq .01$ .

test these hypotheses, we had to choose a response value for each obligation scale that represents a belief that obligations exist. To reiterate, the responses were rated on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (*not at all*) to 5 (*to a very large extent*). We conducted a series of *t* tests to see if the reported obligations exceeded the midpoint. We chose the midpoint of *to some extent* (3) because we wanted a value that was high enough to indicate that protégés and mentors felt the listed obligations without limiting the relationship only to those where the feelings about obligations were particularly strong (i.e., 4 = *to a large extent*).

Results from analyses of the scales indicate that obligations were significantly greater than the midpoint for both mentors and protégés, thus providing support for Hypotheses 1a and 1b ( $ps \leq .001$ ). More specifically, the means for each mentor obligations scale were as follows: mentors' self transactional obligations ( $M = 4.05$ ),  $t(41) = 11.57$ ; mentors' self relational obligations ( $M = 4.43$ ),  $t(41) = 17.65$ ; mentor expected transactional obligations ( $M = 4.04$ ),  $t(41) = 9.81$ ; and mentor expected relational obligations ( $M = 3.63$ ),  $t(41) = 5.66$ . The means for protégés were as follows: protégé self transactional obligations ( $M = 4.39$ ),  $t(150) = 28.01$ ; protégé self relational obligations ( $M = 4.04$ ),  $t(150) = 18.39$ ; protégé expected transactional obligations ( $M = 3.72$ ),  $t(150) = 8.92$ ; and protégé expected relational obligations ( $M = 4.16$ ),  $t(150) = 17.74$ .

To provide additional information about obligations in mentoring relationships, Table 1 presents the means for the individual items that were used to measure transactional and relational obligation. Examination of the items indicates that the highest mentor self obligations to protégés was to be a source of encouragement and advice ( $M = 4.57$ ). Protégés' largest self obligation was their willingness to learn ( $M = 4.65$ ). Analyses at the item level indicate that all items were greater than the midpoint, with the notable exception of mentor reports of protégé obligations of friendship and deference. Such results suggest that mentors do not expect protégés to offer them friendship or deference. We will comment more on this in the Discussion section.

### *Hypotheses 2a and 2b<sup>2</sup>*

We used ANOVA to test Hypothesis 2a, which proposed that informal mentors would report more self and expected relational obligations than

<sup>2</sup>We conducted additional analyses controlling for relationship length, based on a suggestion from an anonymous reviewer, who noted that mentors and protégés who have been in relationships longer might perceive more or different obligations than those who have relationships of shorter duration. Consistent with prior research (e.g., Chao et al., 1992; Ragins & Cotton, 1999), formal relationships were shorter in duration than were informal relationships. Notably, however, relationship length was not related to any of the obligation variables, and ANCOVA analyses using relationship length as a covariate showed no substantive differences in

Table 3

*ANOVA of Mentor and Protégé Reports of Obligations by Formality*

	Relational obligations					Transactional obligations				
	Formal		Informal		<i>F</i> (1, 40)	Formal		Informal		<i>F</i> (1, 40)
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>		<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	
Mentor self	4.22	0.58	4.56	0.45	4.49*	3.90	0.77	4.14	0.43	1.76
Mentor expected	3.56	0.83	3.67	0.65	0.20	4.06	0.72	4.01	0.67	0.04
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>F</i> (1, 148)	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>F</i> (1, 148)
Protégé self	3.86	0.63	4.13	0.72	5.27*	4.22	0.74	4.48	0.49	6.71**
Protégé expected	4.18	0.71	4.14	0.86	0.06	3.69	1.08	3.73	0.97	0.05

*Note.* Formal mentor, *n* = 16; informal mentor, *n* = 26. Formal protégé, *n* = 54; informal protégé, *n* = 94.  
 \**p* ≤ .05. \*\**p* ≤ .01.

would formal mentors (see Table 3). The results indicate that informal mentors reported more self relational obligations (*M* = 4.56) than did formal mentors (*M* = 4.22, *p* = .04), although there were no differences for relational obligations expected of the protégé. Thus, Hypothesis 2a was partially supported. Informal mentors perceived greater relational obligations to protégés than did formal mentors, although formality was not related to relational obligations expected of the protégés.

Hypothesis 2b proposed that informal protégés would perceive more self and other relationship obligations than would formal protégés. Although protégés with informal mentors reported more self relational obligations to their mentors (*M* = 4.13) than did protégés with formal mentors (*M* = 3.86, *p* = .02), we found no significant difference in protégé relational obligations expected of their mentors based on formality (see Table 3). Thus, Hypothesis 2b was partially supported.

Additional exploratory analyses indicate that formality was not related to mentor perceptions of self or expected transactional obligations or to

patterns of significance for either Hypotheses 2a and 2b or Hypotheses 3a and 3b. Therefore, we present the data from the initial ANOVA analyses.

protégés' expected transactional obligations. However, protégés with informal mentors reported more self transactional obligations ( $M = 4.48$ ) than did those with formal mentors ( $M = 4.22$ ,  $p = .01$ ).

In summary, both mentors and protégés in informal relationships reported higher self relational obligations than did individuals in formal relationships. Furthermore, although not hypothesized, informal protégés also reported greater self transactional obligations than did formal protégés. Notably, however, formality was not related to differences in obligations expected from the mentoring partner.

### *Hypotheses 3a and 3b*

Hypothesis 3a proposed that mentors would report greater self and expected transactional obligations in supervisory versus nonsupervisory mentoring relationships. ANOVA results (see Table 4) indicate that mentors in supervisory mentoring relationships reported more self transactional obligations ( $M = 4.23$ ) than did mentors in nonsupervisory mentoring relationships ( $M = 3.78$ ,  $p = .02$ ). Furthermore, mentors in supervisory relationships expected more protégé transactional obligations ( $M = 4.21$ ) than did mentors in nonsupervisory relationships ( $M = 3.78$ ,  $p = .04$ ). Such results support Hypothesis 3a.

The results also provide support for Hypothesis 3b, which proposed that protégés with supervisory mentors would report more self and expected transactional obligations than would protégés with nonsupervisory mentors. Specifically, protégés with supervisory mentors reported more self transactional obligations to their mentors ( $M = 4.47$ ) than did protégés in nonsupervisory relationships ( $M = 4.26$ ,  $p = .04$ ) and expected more mentor transactional obligations ( $M = 3.91$ ) than did protégés with nonsupervisory mentors ( $M = 3.47$ ,  $p = .01$ ).

To summarize, such results suggest that both mentors and protégés in supervisory relationships expect to provide and receive more transactional obligations than do those in nonsupervisory relationships. Additionally, exploratory analyses conducted to investigate whether supervisory status influenced relational obligations indicate no significant differences in either mentor or protégé reports of self or expected relational obligations based on the supervisory status of the mentor. Together, these results indicate that supervisory status influences transactional obligations, but not relational obligations.

## Discussion

We extended prior research by utilizing psychological contract theory to examine the obligations—self and expected—in mentoring relationships.

Table 4  
*ANOVA of Mentor and Protégé Reports of Obligations by Supervisory Status*

	Relational obligations				Transactional obligations			
	Supervisory		Nonsupervisory		Supervisory		Nonsupervisory	
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Mentor self	4.40	0.52	4.47	0.54	4.23	0.49	3.78	0.63
Mentor expected	3.68	0.80	3.55	0.59	4.21	0.55	3.78	0.79
					<i>F</i> (1,40)			<i>F</i> (1,40)
					0.18			6.52*
					0.33			4.33*
Protégé self	3.97	0.75	4.12	0.61	4.47	0.48	4.26	0.73
Protégé expected	4.16	0.83	4.15	0.78	3.91	0.85	3.47	1.12
					<i>F</i> (1,148)			<i>F</i> (1,148)
					1.62			4.55*
					0.00			7.70**

*Note.* Supervisory mentor, *n* = 25; nonsupervisory mentor, *n* = 17. Supervisory protégé, *n* = 85; nonsupervisory protégé, *n* = 65.  
 \**p* ≤ .05. \*\**p* ≤ .01.

This perspective allowed us to shift the focus from the benefits received from mentoring relationships to the obligations relationship partners have to one another. It also allowed us to examine a new context for psychological contracts. Consistent with our hypotheses, mentors and protégés reported obligations to one another, and the obligations differed with respect to the formality or supervisory nature of the relationships.

Regarding formality, informal (vs. formal) mentors and protégés reported owing more relational obligations to their mentoring partners. However, contrary to expectations, formality was not related to obligations that mentors and protégés felt they were owed by the other party. Thus, for both mentors and protégés, formality did not influence perceived obligations *from* the other party, but did influence perceptions of one's obligations *to* the other party, such that individuals reported owing lower obligations in formal relationships. Lower perceived self obligations in the formal relationships might explain why formal relationships are not as successful as are informal relationships (Raabe & Beehr, 2003; Underhill, 2006). This is an important area for future research. For example, researchers might examine the influence of discussing—and perhaps raising—obligations in formal mentoring relationships.

More broadly, our results are consistent with prior evidence that formal protégés reported receiving fewer psychosocial functions from mentors than did informal protégés (Ragins & Cotton, 1999), perhaps because formal relationships are primarily concerned with protégé short-term career goals (Murray, 1991). Future research might further examine potential differences in the type (relational vs. transactional) as well as the level of obligations in formal mentoring relationships. Although formal protégés might receive fewer psychosocial functions (actions actually provided by a mentor) than informal protégés, our research indicates that both formal mentors and protégés perceived that the mentor has an obligation to provide relational/psychosocial functions. Thus, a practical implication of our results is the need for mentors and protégés in formal relationships to communicate their perceived obligations so that they both understand their mutual obligations in the relationship.

Regarding supervisory mentoring, both mentors and protégés in supervisory relationships reported more transactional obligations than did those in nonsupervisory mentoring relationships, although supervisory status did not influence relational obligations. Such evidence suggests that the supervisory mentoring relationship differs from the traditional mentoring relationship in the higher level of career-related obligations that both mentors and protégés feel they owe and expect from the other party.

Although a considerable number of mentors are also supervisors (e.g., Burke & McKeen, 1997), not all supervisors act as mentors. Thus, an important issue for future empirical research is disentangling the effects that supervisor behavior has on the psychological employment contract when

supervisors are also seen as mentors (vs. simply as supervisors). For example, because supervisors are primary contract makers for organizations (Rousseau, 1995), breaches in the supervisory mentoring contract likely coincide with, and perhaps even exacerbate, breaches in the psychological employment contract. More broadly, we encourage future research that compares supervisory and nonsupervisory mentoring relationships.

Finally, our analyses indicate that mentors do not feel that protégés owe them deference or friendship. A lack of obligation to behave with deference might signal that the mentor sees the protégé as an equal or a junior partner in the relationship, or perhaps simply that mentors do not feel that protégés must always acquiesce to the mentor's wishes. More interesting to us is the finding regarding friendship, which is considered a basic element of the relationship (Kram, 1985). The mentoring literature describes the relationship as close (Sosik & Godshalk, 2000a), and some definitions provided to potential protégés included the word *friendship* (Kirchmeyer, 1998). Thus, it was surprising that mentors did not report that protégés were obligated to provide friendship, although protégés reported an obligation to provide friendship to their mentors. Future research to establish the importance of the friendship aspect of the mentoring relationship is warranted. It could be that friendship is more important in peer mentoring than in traditional or supervisory mentoring.

### *Future Research*

By applying psychological contract theory to mentoring relationships, we focus attention on obligations in the relationship and posit that one's perceived obligations to a mentoring partner influence the provision of functions. Thus, although the focus of prior research has been on the mentoring functions provided, we argue that another important factor is what the partners believe are the obligations in the relationship. The focus on psychological contract theory and obligations in relationships generates at least two related topics for future research.

First, psychological contracts are inherently individual perceptions and, as such, are influenced by individual differences (Raja, Johns, & Ntalianis, 2004). Mentoring researchers have expressed an interest in understanding individuals' motives for engaging in the relationship (Allen, 2003), and these motives likely influence the perception of obligations in the relationship and the evaluation of the obligations as fulfilled. For example, if mentors engage in the relationship for altruistic reasons, they may feel more obligations to their protégés than they feel their protégés owe them. Further, if a mentor chooses a particular protégé because he or she thinks the protégé is in need of assistance, the mentor may feel that the protégé's obligation to exhibit will-

ingness to learn is more important than is high performance. The insight gained by future research investigating relationship obligations, as well as the motives for engaging in the relationship could provide valuable insight into how relationships develop and why some are more successful than others.

Second, a psychological contract perspective can provide insight into dysfunctional mentoring relationships through the concepts of psychological contract breach and violation. *Breach* is the perception that the other party has failed to fulfill their obligations, while *violation* is the negative emotional reaction to the breach (e.g., disappointment, anger, resentment; Morrison & Robinson, 1997). Both breach and violation have significant negative consequences for employers and employees (e.g., Raja et al., 2004; Robinson et al., 1994) and occur fairly frequently (Conway & Briner, 2002; Robinson & Rousseau, 1994).

Breach and violation of the psychological mentoring contract are likely to result in similarly negative outcomes for the involved parties. For example, if a protégé believes a mentor promises or is obligated to support the protégé for a promotion, but the mentor fails to do so, the failure of the mentor to provide that support might damage the relationship. More broadly, failure to meet important perceived obligations on the part of either the mentor or the protégé might lead to a dysfunctional relationship. This may be especially true when examining the attributions for the breach.

The attributions individuals make for breach and the severity of the breach are important in determining whether or not violation (Morrison & Robinson, 1997) and other negative consequences will follow (e.g., Kiewitz, Restubog, Zagenczyk, & Hochwarter, 2009; Robinson & Morrison, 2000). Three common attributions that can be applied to the mentoring relationship are renegeing, incongruence, and disruption. *Reneging*, which is the attribution most likely to result in feelings of violation, occurs when an agent of the organization recognizes that an obligation exists, but knowingly fails to meet it (Morrison & Robinson, 1997; Robinson & Morrison, 2000). *Incongruence* exists when the employee and the organizational agent have different understandings of whether or not a given obligation exists, or of the nature of the obligation (Robinson & Morrison, 2000). *Disruption* occurs when contract parties see outside circumstances as intervening to prevent fulfillment of the contract (Morrison & Robinson, 1997).

Notably, such attributions are aligned with Scandura's (1998) typology of dysfunctions, which is based on two dimensions: good or bad intent toward the other, and psychosocial or vocational related action. For example, an attribution of renegeing would be consistent with Scandura's dimension of bad intent wherein the mentor or protégé is seen as intending to cause harm. Incongruence and disruption would be consistent with Scandura's example of an individual who might have good intentions regarding the behavior they

enact, but the behavior is still detrimental. In other words, a perceived lack of malice exists on the part of the offending party.

Attributions for breach in the later stages of the relationship might explain why some mentoring relationships become redefined as friendships (i.e., attribution of disruption or incongruence), whereas other relationships end less positively (i.e., attribution of renegeing). In addition, researchers might examine whether perceived breaches in a mentoring relationship—particularly intentional breaches—influence willingness to engage in future mentoring relationships, which is an important mentoring outcome (Allen, 2003; Allen, Poteet, Russell, & Dobbins, 1997; Ragins & Scandura, 1999). One possibility is that breaches that are interpreted as unintentional have less of an effect, both on the current relationship and on one's willingness to engage in a future mentoring relationship, although future research is needed to investigate such propositions.

The literature on interpersonal citizenship behavior (ICB) might also inform our understanding of psychological mentoring contracts. ICBs are a type of organizational citizenship behavior that is directed toward a specific recipient. Bowler and Brass (2006) stated that ICBs occur “when coworkers assist one another beyond their job requirements in such a way that results, either directly or indirectly, in enhanced individual job performance and ultimately contributes to group and organizational functioning” (p. 70). Bowler and Brass found that individuals with more influence, or with more influential contacts, tended to receive more and provide fewer ICBs than did less influential individuals. Because mentors typically are considered influential individuals, protégés might receive more ICBs from others as a result of their relationship with them.

### *Study Limitations*

This is the first paper to address the mentoring relationship as a context for psychological contracts, and it is not without limitations. We collected self-report data at one point in time, which raises the issue of method variance. However, the primary construct of interest is an internally held belief for which self-reports are an appropriate measure. Furthermore, and importantly, method variance does not explain differences found across verifiable categorical data (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003), such as the formality and supervisory nature of the relationship.

Although we utilized relevant mentor theory to measure obligations, our measures must be replicated and extended. For example, although we categorized career functions as transactional obligations and psychosocial functions as relational obligations, we acknowledge that career and psychosocial

mentoring functions may fulfill both transactional and relational goals. In addition, there might be obligations in the relationship that are not reflected in our measures. These issues may be reflected in some of our scale reliabilities, which were a bit low, although comparable with prior research (Raabe & Beehr, 2003).

Nonetheless, additional research to refine the measures of mentor and protégé obligations would be beneficial. For example, future researchers might ask mentors and protégés to respond to open-ended questions about what obligations they see for themselves and for each other within the relationship. Finally, based on the finding that psychological contracts can change over time, future research might examine longitudinally the development and change of obligations in mentoring relationships. Such research would extend our results and could provide considerable insight on how specific obligations develop within the relationship.

Despite considerable effort to maximize the number of participants, our response rate was not as high as we desired, which raises questions of selection bias. Although we cannot compare the demographic differences between those who returned surveys and those who did not, there were no differences in demographics between the protégé and nonprotégé respondents. In addition, we tested for differences in perceived self and other obligations between protégés whose mentors returned surveys and those whose did not. Of the 17 ANOVAs, only 1 was significant, as might be expected by chance. Thus, we do not believe that selection bias influenced the pattern of results found in our study. Our sample size for the mentor analyses was relatively small, and thus limited the power to find significant results, although the limited power does not negate our positive results. Of course, replicating our findings with a larger sample of mentors and protégés would provide more support for the proposed hypotheses.

Our study provides important contributions to both the psychological contracts and mentoring literatures. Although the psychological contract is not limited to employer–employee contexts, only a small number of studies have examined the other contexts in which psychological contracts develop. Our study extends the psychological contract literature by elaborating on an understudied type of psychological contract: one between individuals.

Psychological contracts between individuals and organizations differ in important ways. First, because psychological contracts are individually held perceptions, organizations cannot hold a psychological contract. One implication of this “one-sided” contract is that the organization itself cannot experience contract breach, although agents of the organization can. Second, the potential for breach is likely higher in individual psychological contracts because both parties are capable of breaching the contract and of interpreting the actions (or inactions) of the other party as breaching the contract.

Our study contributes to mentoring research by examining the mentoring relationship within a psychological contract framework, which extends previous research on this relationship as a social exchange and shifts focus from benefits received from the relationship to obligations expected within the relationship. Our measures provide a starting point for understanding the obligations of both mentors and protégés, and our results indicate that both mentors and protégés see the relationship as one in which they owe and are owed obligations. Notably, however, these obligations are perceived differently, depending on the level of formality and whether or not the mentor is an immediate supervisor. We hope that our study is an impetus for additional research examining the role of perceived obligations in mentoring relationships, given the importance of mentoring relationships for individuals' success at work (Allen et al., 2004; Eby et al., 2006).

#### References

- Allen, T. D. (2003). Mentoring others: A dispositional and motivational approach. *Journal of Vocational Behavior, 62*, 134–154.
- Allen, T. D. (2004). Protégé selection by mentors: Contributing individual and organizational factors. *Journal of Vocational Behavior, 65*, 469–483.
- Allen, T. D., & Eby, L. T. (2004). Factors related to mentor reports of mentoring functions provided: Gender and relational characteristics. *Sex Roles, 50*, 129–139.
- Allen, T. D., Eby, L. T., Poteet, M. L., Lentz, E., & Lima, L. (2004). Career benefits associated with mentoring for protégés: A meta-analysis. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 89*, 127–136.
- Allen, T. D., Poteet, M. L., Russell, J. E. A., & Dobbins, G. H. (1997). A field study of factors related to supervisors' willingness to mentor others. *Journal of Vocational Behavior, 50*, 1–22.
- Blau, P. M. (1964). *Exchange and power in social life*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- Booth, R. (1996). Mentor or manager: What is the difference? A case study in supervisory mentoring. *Leadership and Organization Development Journal, 17*(3), 31–36.
- Bordia, S., Hobman, E. V., Restubog, S. L., & Bordia, P. (2010). Advisor–student relationship in business education project collaborations: A psychological contract perspective. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 40*, 2360–2386.
- Bowler, W. M., & Brass, D. J. (2006). Relational correlates of interpersonal citizenship behavior: A social network perspective. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 91*, 70–82.

- Burke, R. J., & McKeen, C. A. (1997). Benefits of mentoring relationships among managerial and professional women: A cautionary tale. *Journal of Vocational Behavior, 51*, 43–57.
- Chao, G. T., Walz, P. M., & Gardner, P. D. (1992). Formal and informal mentorships: A comparison of mentoring functions and contrast with nonmentored counterparts. *Personnel Psychology, 45*, 619–636.
- Conway, N., & Briner, R. B. (2002). A daily diary study of affective responses to psychological contract breach and exceeded promises. *Journal of Organizational Behavior, 23*, 287–302.
- Dabos, G. E., & Rousseau, D. M. (2004a). Mutuality and reciprocity in the psychological contracts of employees and employers. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 89*, 52–72.
- Dabos, G. E., & Rousseau, D. M. (2004b). Social interaction patterns shaping employee psychological contracts. *Academy of Management Best Papers Proceedings, OB*, N1-N6.
- Dreher, G. F., & Chargois, J. A. (1998). Gender, mentoring experiences, and salary attainment among graduates of an historically Black university. *Journal of Vocational Behavior, 53*, 401–416.
- Eby, L. T., Butts, M., Lockwood, A., & Simon, S. A. (2004). Protégés' negative mentoring experiences: Construct development and nomological validation. *Personnel Psychology, 57*, 411–447.
- Eby, L. T., Durley, J. R., Evans, S. C., & Ragins, B. R. (2006). The relationship between short-term mentoring benefits and long-term mentoring outcomes. *Journal of Vocational Behavior, 69*, 424–444.
- Eby, L. T., Rhodes, J., & Allen, T. D. (2007). Definition and evolution of mentoring. In T. D. Allen & L. T. Eby (Eds.), *Blackwell handbook of mentoring: A multidisciplinary approach* (pp. 7–20). Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
- Eddleston, K. A., Kidder, D. L., & Litzky, B. E. (2002). Who's the boss? Contending with competing expectations from customers and management. *Academy of Management Executive, 16*(4), 85–95.
- Ensher, E. A., Thomas, C., & Murphy, S. E. (2001). Comparison of traditional, step-ahead, and peer mentoring on protégés' support, satisfaction, and perceptions of career success: A social exchange perspective. *Journal of Business and Psychology, 15*, 419–438.
- Green, S. G., & Bauer, T. N. (1995). Supervisory mentoring by advisers: Relationships with doctoral student potential, productivity, and commitment. *Personnel Psychology, 48*, 537–561.
- Higgins, M. C., & Kram, K. E. (2001). Reconceptualizing mentoring at work: A developmental network perspective. *Academy of Management Review, 26*, 264–288.

- Ho, V. T. (2005). Social influence on evaluations of psychological contract fulfillment. *Academy of Management Review*, *30*, 113–128.
- Ho, V. T., & Levesque, L. L. (2005). With a little help from my friends (and substitutes): Social referents and influence in psychological contract fulfillment. *Organization Science*, *16*, 275–289.
- Ho, V. T., Rousseau, D. M., & Levesque, L. L. (2006). Social networks and the psychological contract: Structural holes, cohesive ties, and beliefs regarding employer obligations. *Human Relations*, *59*, 459–481.
- Kiewitz, C., Restubog, S. L., Zagenczyk, T. J., & Hochwarter, W. A. (2009). The interactive effects of psychological contract breach and organizational politics on perceived organizational support: Evidence from two longitudinal studies. *Journal of Management Studies*, *46*, 806–832.
- Kingshott, R. P. J. (2007). The impact of psychological contracts on trust and commitment in supplier–distributor relationships. *European Journal of Marketing*, *41*, 1053–1072.
- Kirchmeyer, C. (1998). Determinants of managerial career success: Evidence and explanation of male/female differences. *Journal of Management*, *24*, 673–692.
- Kram, K. E. (1985). *Mentoring at work: Developmental relationships in organizational life*. Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman & Co.
- Lester, S. W., Turnley, W. H., Bloodgood, J. M., & Bolino, M. C. (2002). Not seeing eye to eye: Differences in supervisory and subordinate perceptions of and attributions for psychological contract breach. *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, *23*, 39–56.
- Morrison, E. W., & Robinson, S. L. (1997). When employees feel betrayed: A model of how psychological contract violation develops. *Academy of Management Review*, *22*, 226–258.
- Mullen, E. J., & Noe, R. A. (1999). The mentoring information exchange: When do mentors seek information from their protégés? *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, *20*, 233–242.
- Murray, M. (Ed.). (1991). *Beyond the myths and magic of mentoring: How to facilitate an effective mentoring program*. College Park, MD: Jossey-Bass.
- Noe, R. A. (1988). An investigation of the determinants of successful assigned mentoring relationships. *Personnel Psychology*, *41*, 457–479.
- Noe, R. A., Greenberger, D. B., & Wang, S. (2002). Mentoring: What we know and where we might go. *Research in Personnel and Human Resources Management*, *21*, 129–173.
- Podsakoff, P. M., MacKenzie, S. B., Lee, J.-Y., & Podsakoff, N. P. (2003). Common method biases in behavioral research: A critical review of the literature and recommended remedies. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *88*, 879–903.

- Raabe, B., & Beehr, T. A. (2003). Formal mentoring versus supervisor and coworker relationships: Differences in perceptions and impact. *Journal of Organizational Behavior, 24*, 271–293.
- Ragins, B. R., & Cotton, J. L. (1999). Mentor functions and outcomes: A comparison of men and women in formal and informal mentoring relationships. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 84*, 529–550.
- Ragins, B. R., & McFarlin, D. B. (1990). Perceptions of mentor roles in cross-gender mentor relationships. *Journal of Vocational Behavior, 37*, 321–340.
- Ragins, B. R., & Scandura, T. A. (1999). Burden or blessing? Expected costs and benefits of being a mentor. *Journal of Organizational Behavior, 20*, 493–509.
- Raja, U., Johns, G., & Ntalianis, F. (2004). The impact of personality on psychological contracts. *Academy of Management Journal, 47*, 350–367.
- Robinson, S. L. (1996). Trust and breach of the psychological contract. *Administrative Science Quarterly, 41*, 574–599.
- Robinson, S. L., Kraatz, M. S., & Rousseau, D. M. (1994). Changing obligations and the psychological contract: A longitudinal study. *Academy of Management Journal, 37*, 137–152.
- Robinson, S. L., & Morrison, E. W. (1995). Psychological contracts and OCB: The effect of unfulfilled obligations on civic virtue behavior. *Journal of Organizational Behavior, 16*, 289–298.
- Robinson, S. L., & Morrison, E. W. (2000). The development of psychological contract breach and violation: A longitudinal study. *Journal of Organizational Behavior, 21*, 525–546.
- Robinson, S. L., & Rousseau, D. M. (1994). Violating the psychological contract: Not the exception but the norm. *Journal of Organizational Behavior, 15*, 245–259.
- Rousseau, D. M. (1989). Psychological and implied contracts in organizations. *Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal, 2*, 121–139.
- Rousseau, D. M. (1995). *Psychological contracts in organizations: Understanding written and unwritten agreements*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Rousseau, D. M. (2001). Schema, promise, and mutuality: The building blocks of the psychological contract. *Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology, 74*, 511–541.
- Rousseau, D. M., & McLean Parks, J. (1993). The contracts of individuals and organizations. In L. L. Cummings & B. M. Staw (Eds.), *Research in organizational behavior* (Vol. 15, pp. 1–43). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
- Rousseau, D. M., & Tijoriwala, S. A. (1998). Assessing psychological contracts: Issues, alternatives, and measures. *Journal of Organizational Behavior, 19*, 679–695.

- Scandura, T. A. (1998). Dysfunctional mentoring relationships and outcomes. *Journal of Management*, 24, 449–467.
- Scandura, T. A., & Schriesheim, C. A. (1994). Leader–member exchange and supervisor career mentoring as complementary constructs in leadership research. *Academy of Management Journal*, 37, 1588–1602.
- Scandura, T. A., & Williams, E. A. (2001). An investigation of the moderating effects of gender on the relationships between mentorship initiation and protégé perceptions of mentoring functions. *Journal of Vocational Behavior*, 59, 342–363.
- Scandura, T. A., & Williams, E. A. (2002). Leadership in the context of psychological contract breach: The role of mentoring. In L. L. Neider & C. A. Schriesheim (Eds.), *Leadership* (pp. 167–195). Greenwich, CT: Information Age.
- Scandura, T. A., & Williams, E. A. (2004). Mentoring and transformational leadership: The role of supervisory career mentoring. *Journal of Vocational Behavior*, 65, 448–468.
- Sosik, J. J., & Godshalk, V. M. (2000a). Leadership style, mentoring functions received, and job-related stress: A conceptual model and preliminary study. *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, 21, 365–390.
- Sosik, J. J., & Godshalk, V. M. (2000b). The role of gender in mentoring: Implications for diversified and homogenous mentoring relationships. *Journal of Vocational Behavior*, 57, 102–122.
- Spencer, R. (2006). Understanding the mentoring process between adolescents and adults. *Youth and Society*, 37, 287–315.
- Sutton, G., & Griffin, M. A. (2004). Integrating expectations, experiences, and psychological contract violations: A longitudinal study of new professionals. *Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology*, 77, 493–514.
- Underhill, C. M. (2006). The effectiveness of mentoring programs in corporate settings: A meta-analytic review of the literature. *Journal of Vocational Behavior*, 68, 292–307.
- Wanberg, C. R., Welsh, E. T., & Hezlett, S. A. (2003). Mentoring research: A review and dynamic process model. In G. R. Ferris & J. J. Martocchio (Eds.), *Research in personnel and human resources management* (Vol. 22, pp. 39–124). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
- Young, A. M., & Perrewé, P. L. (2000). What did you expect? An examination of career-related support and social support among mentors and protégés. *Journal of Management*, 26, 611–632.
- Young, A. M., & Perrewé, P. L. (2004). The role of expectations in the mentoring exchange: An analysis of mentor and protégé expectations in relation to perceived support. *Journal of Managerial Issues*, 16, 103–126.